RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
FEDERAL TAXATION: SUPREME COURT ANNOUNCES
"PROPER REGARD" TEST TO DETERMINE CONCLUSIVENESS OF STATE COURT ADJUDICATIONS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS

M

than thirty years has elapsed since the Supreme Court's
enigmatic pronouncement in Freuler v. Helvering1 that, in the
absence of collusion, federal courts are bound by state trial court
characterizations of property interests when state law is determinative
of federal tax liability. In an effort to resolve the ensuing conflict and
confusion both among and within the circuits, 2 the problem was
revisited in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch.3 The decedent Bosch
created a trust for his wife and gave her a general power of appointment which she subsequently attempted to release. Upon decedent's
death, the estate, asserting that the release was invalid, claimed a
marital deduction for the widow's trust under section 2056 (b) (5)
of the Internal Revenue Code.4 After receiving a deficiency notice
from the Commissioner, respondent-estate concurrently petitioned
for redetermination in the Tax Court 5 and successfully sought to have
a state trial court declare the release null and void. 6 The Tax Court
accepted the state trial court's decision as conclusive since it was
"an authoritative exposition of New York law and adjudication of
the property rights involved."7 The Supreme Court, reversing
ORE

the court of appeal's affirmance of the Tax Court decision,8 held
that where federal estate tax liability is at stake, federal courts are
1291 U.S. 35, 45 (1934); accord, Sharp v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 624 (1938)
(mem.); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1937).
-See Commissioner v. Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
8387 U.S. 456 (1967).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (5).
8Estate of Herman J. Bosch, 43 T.C. 120 (1964).
6 See Commissioner v. Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1011 n.3 (2d Cir. 1966) (reproducing
fully the decision of the New York Supreme Court).
743 T.C. at 124.
8Commissioner v. Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966).
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not bound by state trial court characterizations of the property interests involved.9
While some courts have felt that the Erie doctrine 0 compelled
deference to state substantive determinations,"' others12 have relied
upon the Rules of Decision Act' 8 which provides that, in the absence
of contrary authorization, the "laws of the several states.., shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply." However, neither Erie
nor the Rules of Decision Act encompasses guidelines for determining the effect to be given decrees of subordinate state courts
where the question is not whether the federal court is bound by the
law as stated therein, but rather, whether it is bound by that particular adjudication of the parties' rights.' 4
Prior to Bosch virtually every circuit had attempted to formulate
a test for assessing the weight to be accorded such state trial court
decisions. Some interpreted Freuler as indicating that state court
decrees, if binding on the parties, were conclusive, even where the
proceeding was non-adversary. 5 Others held that a decision resulting from a non-adversary proceeding was not binding.' 6 Several
circuits 7 attempted to ascribe to "adversity" the attributes of "collusion" set forth in Freuler, "collusive in the sense that all parties
.. sought a decision which would adversely affect the Government's
right to additional.., tax."18 Another line of cases turned on the
effect of the state trial court decision upon other state courts at the
same level.' Still other circuits based their decisions on variations
'10387 U.S. at 465.
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 804 U.S. 64 (1938).
"See Kilian v. Louisville & N.R.R., 374 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1967); Peyton v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963).
I*See Salt Lake County v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 163 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 832 (1948); United States v. Thurston County, 54 F. Supp. 201
(D. Neb. 1944). aff'd, 149 F.2d 485 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.. 744 (1945).
1 28 UAC.C. § 1652 (1964).
"'See Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the Radiating Potencies of State Decisions, 51
YALE L.J. 783, 792-93 (1942).
15
See Commissioner'v. Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966); Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
1
0 See Stallworth v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958); Wolfsen v. Smyth,
223 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1955).
1
7 See Peyton v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Sweet v. Commissioner,
234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956); Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955).
Is291 US. at 45.
19See Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1965), aff'd, 387
U.S. 456 (1967); Pierpont v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
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approaches. 20

of these
By the time Bosch was considered by the
Court, however, it had become clear that regardless of the test employed, some circuits rarely followed state trial court decisions, 21
while others consistently gave them conclusive effect. 22
The uncertainty evidenced in the lower federal courts finds little
resolution in Bosch, a five-to-four decision with three separate dissents. Concluding that the Commissioner was not bound by the
state court decision under either the principle of res judicata or
collateral estoppel, and that the proceeding was "brought for the
purpose of directly affecting federal estate tax liability," 23 the Court
sought exposition of the problem in the legislative history of the
tax provision in question. Focusing on a Senate Finance Committee's conclusion that "proper regard" should be accorded state
court determinations,2 4 the Court reasoned that the phrase implied
that state court decisions were not necessarily conclusive.2 5 Further,
the Court analogized to the effect given state court decrees in diversity
cases under the Rules of Decision Act and Erie doctrine, and concluded that, as in diversity cases, in the absence of a determination
by the highest state court, the decision of a state trial court, though
a datum for ascertaining state law, is not controlling.2 The Court
also indicated that the same reasoning applies in a lesser degree to
27
decisions of intermediate state appellate courts.
The "proper regard" test enunicated by the majority in Bosch
casts no additional light on the problem since no attempt was made
to give content to the phrase. Hence the federal courts, again, are
left to resolve the question for themselves. The Bosch case, however,
represents a marked change in the Court's attitude toward the conclusiveness of state court decrees. While Freuler responded to the
20See, e.g., Faulkerson v. United States, 801 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962) (non-adversary,
collusive, and ex parte); Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952) (nonadversary and collusive); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 768 (M.D.
Ala. 1959), aff'd, 285 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1961) (non-adversary and collusive).
21See Stallworth v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958); Wolfsen v. Smyth,
223 F.2d II (9th Cir. 1955); Newman v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1955);
Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952).
22 See Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962); Gallagher v. Smith,
223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
23 387 U.S. at 463.
21S. R P. No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948).
2r5
387 U.S. at 464.
28Id. at 465.
2

7 ,d.
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problem with a qualified "conclusive," the tenor of Bosch favors a
more ready reexamination of the parties' legal status in the federal
courts. This difference in approach will undoubtedly encourage
those circuits which denied effect to state court decrees to continue
doing so, and may induce the others to follow suit.
While the narrow holding in Bosch is no more than a rejection
of the conclusive effect which the Second and Third Circuits, among
others, have given state adjudications not obviously collusive,'2 8 the
impact of Bosch may transcend these bounds. The decision could
be extended to allow a federal rehearing on the merits in any case
where interests under a federal statute are determined by state law.
The extent of federal legislation incorporating state law29 draws
sharply into focus the potential impact of Bosch on the "delicate
and important" 30 relationship between state and federal judicial
systems. Should the Bosch principle be extended to other federal
statutes incorporating state law, the federal courts would not merely
be rejecting an offered interpolation of state law deduced from lower
state court cases, as may occur in diversity cases; rather, an adjudicadon of property and other rights traditionally within the state
court's jurisdiction would be rejected. In an action involving a title
controversy, for example, a party's property rights and tax liabilities
lose their essential nexus if Bosch is extended indiscriminately.A1
Taken in this light the Court's failure to provide a standard for
assessing the conclusiveness of state court decisions may well have
outweighed the advantage gained in protecting federal revenue from
the minor threat of ex post facto estate planning.
28See Commissioner v. Bosch, 863 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966); Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
"9See, e.g., Cruz v. Gardner, 375 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1967); Hill, The Erie Doctrine
in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. R~v. 1013 (1953); Seidelson & Bowler, Determination of
Family Status in the Administration of Federal Acts: A Choice of Law Problem for
Federal Agencies and Courts, 33 GEo. WASH. L. R1v. 863 (1965); Note, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 1084 (1964).

"8387 U.S. at 477 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81387 U.S. at 470 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

